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Jurisdiction: Burnham v. Superior Court: Adding
Confusion to Transient Jurisdiction
I. Introduction
The long accepted transient rule of in personam jurisdiction
has outlived its usefulness in light of modern methods of obtain-
ing jurisdiction over defendants such as long-arm and nonresident
motorist statutes. Shaffer's pronouncement of new standards for
quasi in rem jurisdiction and the existing International Shoe
standards which apply to defendants not physically present in the
state, also render continued application of the transient rule
unfair and unnecessary.'
The above excerpt illustrates the prevailing belief among commentators
that transient jurisdiction, especially in light of Shaffer v. Heitner,2 is an
invalid method to obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.'
The doctrine of transient jurisdiction allows a state court to acquire personal
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based solely on the physical service
of process on the defendant while in the forum.4 A defendant, served with
process while physically present in the forum, is subject to the personal
jurisdiction of the forum, even though none of the parties to the action
1. Bernstine, A Death Warrant for the Transient Rule of in Personam Jurisdiction?, 25
Vma. L. RE v. 38, 68 (1979-1980). Professor Werner similarly stated that the 'catch as catch
can' theory of in personam jurisdiction, based upon the unrelated physical presence of a
defendant within the forum state, is, and should be, entombed.. . ." Werner, Dropping the
Other Shoe: Shaffer v. Heitner and the Demise of Presence-Oriented Jurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 565, 589 (1979).
2. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
3. See also Abrams, Power, Convenience, and the Elimination of Personal Jurisdiction
in the Federal Courts, 58 IND. L.J. 1, 18 (1982-1983); Brilmayer, A General Look at General
Jurisdiction, 66 TEx. L. Rav. 721, 755 (1988); Ehrenzweig, The Transient Rule of Personal
Jurisdiction: The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YAm L.J. 289, 312 (1956); Lacy,
Personal Jurisdiction and Service of Summons After Shaffer v. Heitner, 57 OR. L. REv. 505,
511 (1978); Leflar, Transient Jurisdiction - Remnant of Pennoyer v. Neff: A Round Table,
9 J. PuaL. L. 281, 292 (1960); Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested
Analysis, 79 HAv. L. REv. 1121, 1178-79 (1966); Posnak, A Uniform Approach to Judicial
Jurisdiction After World-Wide and the Abolition of the "Gotcha" Theory, 30 EMORY L.J.
729, 770 (1981); Reese, Shaffer v. Heitner: Implications for the Doctrine of Seider v. Roth,
63 IowA L. Rav. 1023 (1978); Sobeloff, Jurisdiction of State Courts Over Non-Residents in
our Federal System, 43 CoRN L.Q. 196, 208 (1957); Stewart, Forum Nonconveniens: A
Doctrine in Search of a Role, 74 CALiF. L. R-v. 1259, 1274 (1986); Vernon, Single-Factor
Bases of In Personam Jurisdiction - A Speculation on the Impact of Shaffer v. Heitner, 1978
VAsH. U.L.Q. 273, 294. But see Glen, An Analysis of "Mere Presence" and Other Traditional
Bases of Jurisdiction, 45 BRooKLYN L. RE. 607, 615-16 (1979); Casad, Shaffer v. Heitner:
An End to Ambivalence in Jurisdiction Theory?, 26 KAN. L. REv. 61, 77 (1977).
4. Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 289.
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may reside in the forum and even though the cause of action may be
completely unrelated to the forum.5
In May 1990, the United States Supreme Court, in Burnham v. Superior
Court,6 reaffirmed the validity of transient jurisdiction. Burnham, a land-
mark case destined for law school casebooks, 7 held that the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment is not violated when personal jurisdic-
tion is obtained over a nonresident defendant based solely on the doctrine
of transient jurisdiction.8
This note will first offer a brief history of personal jurisdiction relating
to the evolution of transient jurisdiction. Included will be the current status
of transient jurisdiction as treated by American courts, commentators, and
the American Law Institute. Second, this note will analyze the fragmented
opinion of Burnham as the Court attempted to establish a basis for the
doctrine of transient jurisdiction. Finally, this note will attempt to reconcile
the results that Burnham's confusing opinion will have on future transient
jurisdictional disputes. 9
II. History
A. Personal Jurisdiction
Pennoyer v. Neff, 0 the seminal American case defining the two basic
principles of jurisdiction, held that "every State possesses exclusive juris-
5. Id.; see also Burnham v. Superior Court, 110 S. Ct. 2105, 2120 n.1 (1990) (Brennan
J., concurring) (defining transient jurisdiction as "jurisdiction premised solely on the fact that
a person is served with process while physically present in the forum State").
6. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990) (Scalia, J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered
an opinion in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J., joined, and in which White, J., joined
as to parts I, II-A, II-B, and II-C. Brennan, J., filed an opinion concurring in the judgment,
in which Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor, JJ., joined. White, J., filed an opinion con-
curring in part and concurring in the judgment. Stevens, J., filed an opinion concurring in
the judgment).
7. Mullenix, Badly Fractured Decisions Muddy Cases on Venue, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 13,
1990, at S9 (Supreme Court Review section).
8. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2119.
9. This note will not include the related but separate issue of whether the presence of an
agent or employee cf a corporation in a forum will constitute presence of the corporation
such that personal jurisdiction may be obtained over the corporation by service of process of
the agent. One court specifically noted the significance of the distinction between the presence
of an individual and the presence of a corporation in transient jurisdictional questions. Scholz
Research & Dev., Inc. v. Kurzke, 720 F. Supp. 710 (N.D. 111. 1989). Scholz held that physical
service of an individual is sufficient .to confer personal jurisdiction over an individual but
physical service of an agent or officer of a corporation is insufficient to confer personal
jurisdiction over the corporation. Id. at 713.
10. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). In Pennoyer, Neff brought an ejectment action against Pennoyer
seeking to recover land held by Pennoyer. Pennoyer had purchased the land in a sheriff's sale
which was conducted to execute an earlier default judgment obtained in a suit against Neff
by Mitchell. The suit by Mitchell was brought in an Oregon state court. At the time of the
Mitchell suit, Neff was not a resident of Oregon, but an Oregon statute allowed service by
publication on nonresidents who had property within the state. Mitchell served Neff by
publication in an Oregon newspaper. The Supreme Court, ruling that the Oregon statute was
[Vol. 44:551
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diction and sovereignty over persons and property within its territory."'"
The second principle of Pennoyer is that "no State can exercise direct
jurisdiction and authority over persons or property without its territory.'
12
Under Pennoyer, a defendant's physical presence within the forum is a
prerequisite to the forum's ability to render a judgement personally binding
on the defendant.13 The doctrine of transient jurisdiction evolved from the
basic principles in Pennoyer.
Pennoyer illustrates the historic belief that all assertions of jurisdiction
must be based on the physical power of a forum. The Pennoyer decision
thus became known as the "power theory,' '14 under which a court has the
power to assert jurisdiction over an individual solely because the individual
is served in the forum.'5
Supreme Court decisions following Pennoyer have resulted in considerable
weakening of the Pennoyer power theory.' 6 In International Shoe Co. v.
State of Washington, 7 for example, the Supreme Court recognized that the
due process clause does not absolutely require that states follow strict
territorial limits on jurisdiction. 8 The Court held that a defendant need not
be physically present in the forum for the forum to obtain personal juris-
diction over the defendant. 9 As long as the defendant has minimum contacts
with the forum such that the maintenance of the suit would be consistent
with "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," no due
process violation arises.20
The effect of International Shoe on the power theory of Pennoyer is that
a defendant's minimum contacts with the forum state substitute for the
unconstitutional because it conferred in personam jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant
when there was no personal service on the nonresident defendant in the state, refused to
recognize the validity of Mitchell's judgment against Neff. Id. at 733-34.
11. Id. at 722.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 733-34 (emphasis added). Pennoyer held that a judgment by a court lacking
personal jurisdiction violates the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 733.
14. See generally Ehrenzweig, supra note 3.
15. Brilmayer, supra note 3, at 748. Pennoyer apparently relied on Justice Story's statement
that "[w]here a party is within a territory, he may justly be subjected to its process, and
bound personally by the judgment pronounced on such process against him." Pennoyer, 95
U.S. at 724.
16. Bernstine, supra note 1, at 40.
17. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). International Shoe was incorporated in Delaware, but had its
principle place of business in Missouri. International Shoe had no place of business in
Washington, but it did employ residents in Washington who displayed samples and solicited
orders for International Shoe. The state of Washington sued International Shoe to force it to
make contributions to Washington's unemployment compensation fund. Washington served
process on one of International Shoe's salesmen in Washington. International Shoe claimed
there was no in personam jurisdiction because International Shoe was not a Washington
corporation and was not doing business within Washington. The Court held that Washington
had in personam jurisdiction over International Shoe. Id. at 320.
18. Id. at 319.
19. Id. at 316.
20. Id. (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457 (1940)).
1991]
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defendant's physical presence. However, International Shoe did not change
the applicability of the Pennoyer power theory when the defendant was
physically present in the forum. 21 Even after International Shoe, a defen-
dant's physical presence in the forum was still a sufficient basis for personal
jurisdiction regardless of whether the defendant had minimum contacts with
the forum.?
In 1977, the Supreme Court case of Shaffer v. Heitnei3 prompted com-
mentators to reconsider whether a defendant's physical presence in a forum,
absent minimum contacts, is still sufficient as the sole basis in obtaining
personal jurisdiction. Prior to Shaffer, a defendant's mere physical presence
within a forum was sufficient under the power theory of Pennoyer to obtain
personal jurisdiction.2 Justice Marshall, however, altered the concept that
physical presence alone is sufficient for personal jurisdiction by stating in
Shaffer that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated
according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.' '
The Shaffer holding, that a forum's physical power over property is
insufficient to justify in rem jurisdiction, 26 clearly undermines the power
theory of Pennoyer. In similar fashion, Justice Marshall's broad statement 27
implies that future assertions of in personam jurisdiction must also be based
on the minimum contacts test of International Shoe. The question thus
arose, after Shaffer, whether a nonresident defendant's transient presence
within a forum, absent any other contacts with the forum, is sufficient to
establish in personam jurisdiction over the defendant.
2s
21. Id. International Shoe created an explicit exception to the minimum contacts test for
situations when the defendant is present in the forum by stating that "due process requires
only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be not present
within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with [the forum] .....
Id. (emphasis added).
22. Bernstine, supra note 1, at 45.
23. 433 U.S. 186 (1977). In Shaffer, the plaintiff filed a shareholder's derivative suit against
Greyhound Corporation, a Delaware corporation with its principle place of business in Arizona.
The plaintiff, a nonresident of Delaware, filed the suit in Delaware. The Delaware court,
pursuant to a state sequestration statute, acquired quasi in rem jurisdiction over Greyhound
by sequestering Greyhound's property. Greyhound's property within the state consisted mostly
of stocks and corporate options. Greyhound claimed that the sequestration statue violated due
process because Greyhound's contacts with Delaware were insufficient to constitute minimum
contacts. The Court held that Delaware's assertion of quasi in rem jurisdiction must satisfy
the minimum contacts ,standard of fairness in International Shoe. Id. at 212.
24. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
25. Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212 (emphasis added).
26. In rem jurisdiction is defined as a "technical term used to designate proceedings or
actions instituted agaim't the thing, in contradistinction to personal actions, which are said to
be in personam." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 713 (5th ed. 1979) (emphasis in original). Juris-
diction over property would be included as in rem jurisdiction.
27. See supra text accompanying note 25.
28. Commentators argue that the effect of Shaffer is to prohibit a state court from obtaining
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant based solely on the defendant's transitory
presence in the forum. See supra note 3.
[Vol. 44:551
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B. Transient Jurisdiction
Commentators disagree about the common law history of transient juris-
diction.29 As to the modern concept of transient jurisdiction, the weight of
judicial authority recognizes the validity of transient jurisdiction.30 A handful
of modern cases, however, hold that transient jurisdiction is an invalid
jurisdictional doctrine.31 The following three cases are illustrative of the
varying approaches courts have used to disapprove of the doctrine of
transient jurisdiction.
Bershaw v. Sarbacher32 held that transient jurisdiction over a natural
person is not a sufficient basis upon which to obtain personal jurisdiction.
In Bershaw, the plaintiff and her minor daughter filed a paternity action
in Washington against the defendant. The defendant was served while he
was visiting Washington upon the request of the plaintiff. The court held
that the defendant's physical presence in Washington would not justify
personal jurisdiction over the defendant because all assertions of jurisdiction
29. Compare Bernstine, supra note 1, at 44 (noting that the doctrine of transient jurisdiction
has "so permeated" judicial reasoning that it has rarely been challenged) with Ehrenzweig,
supra note 3, at 293-96 (noting that the doctrine of transient jurisdiction may not be as
entrenched as many commentators believe). The dispute as to the history of transient jurisdiction
was continued in Burnham between Justices Scalia and Brennan. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at
2110-13, 2122-25. A comprehensive analysis of the common law history of transient jurisdiction
is beyond the scope of this note. For a detailed analysis of the common law history of transient
jurisdiction, see Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 312; Werner, supra note 1, at 568-71.
30. See, e.g., Rittenhouse v. Mabry, 832 F.2d 1380, 1389 (5th Cir. 1987); Amusement
Equip., Inc. v. Mordelt, 779 F.2d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1985); Donald Manter Co. v. Davis, 543
F.2d 419, 420 (1st Cir. 1976); Scholz Research and Dev., Inc. v. Kurzke, 720 F. Supp. 710,
712-13 (N.D. I11. 1989); Leab v. Streit, 584 F. Supp. 748, 755-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Ruggieri
v. General Well Serv., Inc., 535 F. Supp. 525, 529 (D. Colo. 1982); Opert v. Schmid, 535 F.
Supp. 591, 593-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Aluminal Indus., Inc. v. Newtown Commercial Assocs.,
89 F.R.D. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442, 447 (E.D. Ark.
1959); O'Brien v. Eubanks, 701 P.2d 614, 616 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S.
904 (1985); Wolfson v. Wolfson, 455 So. 2d 577, 578 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Hutto v.
Plagens, 254 Ga. 512, 330 S.E.2d 341, 343 (1985); Humphrey v. Langford, 246 Ga. 732, 273
S.E.2d 22, 23 (1980); In re Marriage of Pridemore, 146 Ill. App. 3d 990, 497 N.E.2d 818,
819-20 (1986); Swarts v. Dean, 13 Kan. App. 2d 228, 766 P.2d 1291, 1293 (1989); Nielsen v.
Braland, 264 Minn. 481, 119 N.W.2d 737, 738 (1963); Read v. Sonat Offshore Drilling, Inc.,
515 So. 2d 1229, 1231 (Miss. 1987); Cariaga v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court of State, 104 Nev.
544, 762 P.2d 886, 887 (1988); Lockert v. Breedlove, 321 N.C. 66, 361 S.E.2d 581, 583 (1987);
Jenkins v. Jenkins, 89 N.C. App. 705, 367 S.E.2d 4, 5-6 (1988); EI-Maksoud v. E1-Maksoud,
237 N.J. Super. 483, 568 A.2d 140, 143 (Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1989); Carr v. Carr, 375 S.E.2d
190, 192 (W. Va. 1988); Nutri-West v. Gibson, 764 P.2d 693, 695-96 (Wyo. 1988).
31. See, e.g., Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of U.S.A., 765 F.2d 42, 46-47 (3d Cir. 1985);
Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software Ltd., 626 F. Supp. 305, 313 (N.D. II1. 1986);
Energy Reserves Group, Inc. v. Superior Oil Co., 460 F. Supp. 483, 496 (D. Kan. 1978);
Schreiber v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 448 F. Supp. 1079, 1089 (D. Kan. 1978), rev'd on other
grounds, 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979); Duehring v. Vasquez, 490 So. 2d 667, 671 (La. Ct.
App. 1986); Swenson v. Thibaut, 39 N.C. App. 77, 250 S.E.2d 279, 293 (1978), rev. denied,
296 N.C. 740, 254 S.E.2d 181 (1979); Bershaw v. Sarbacher, 40 Wash. App. 653, 700 P.2d
347, 349 (1985).
32. 40 Wash. App. 653, 700 P.2d 347, 349 (1985).
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must be evaluated according to International Shoe.3  The terse treatment of
transient jurisdiction in Bershaw does not shed light on the justification for
invalidating the doctrine of transient jurisdiction.
A more enlightening case, which disapproves of transient jurisdiction, is
Harold M. Pitman Co. v. Typecraft Software, Ltd.34 In Pitman, an Illinois
corporation brought an action against both a British corporation and a
United Kingdom resident for breach of contract. The United Kingdom
resident was personally served while in Illinois attending a business conven-
tion. Pitman held that mere service of process of the United Kingdom
resident in Illinois does not vest Illinois with personal jurisdiction.
3
1
According to the court, none of the cases cited by the plaintiff in support
of transient jurisdiction seriously considered the effect that Shaffer had on
transient jurisdiction. 36 The court emphasized that Shaffer expressed its
preference for "assessing assertions of jurisdiction by a single standard.
' 37
Relying on Shqffer, the court used the oft-quoted Shaffer statement that
"all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the
standards set forth in International Shoe and its progeny.
38
The Third Circuit's decision in Nehemiah v. Athletics Congress of U.S.A. 39
is often quoted as supporting the proposition that transient jurisdiction is
an invalid method to obtain personal jurisdiction. In Nehemiah, agents of
the International Amateur Athletic Federation (IAAF), an unincorporated
association, were personally served in New Jersey.40 The court held that
33. Id., 700 P.2d at 349. The court stated that the defendant's "transient presence in
Washington was insufficient to require him to conduct his defense in Washington." Id.
34. 626 F. Supp. 305 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
35. Id. at 312.
36. Pitman, 626 F. Supp. at 311. The plaintiff in Pitman cited Ruggieri v. General Well
Serv., 535 F. Supp. 525 (D. Colo. 1982); Opert v. Schmid, 535 F. Supp. 591 (S.D.N.Y. 1982);
Aluminal Indus., Inc. v. Newtown Commercial Assocs., 89 F.R.D. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
37. Id. at 312 (quoting Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 209 (1977)). The court apparently
interprets Shaffer as implying an intention to apply the minimum contacts test to all types of
jurisdictional questions, presumably including in personam jurisdiction. Accordingly, applying
the minimum contacts test to in personam jurisdiction would preclude the validity of the
doctrine of transient jurisdiction.
38. Id. Pitman also emphasized the public policy effects of allowing transient jurisdiction:
Under Shaffer, a court may not sequester a defendant's property and assert in
rem or quasi in rem jurisdiction unless there are minimum contacts between the
defendant, the litigation and the forum. Were the court to hold that minimum
contacts need not be present for an exercise of in personam jurisdiction over a
defendant preseat in the jurisdiction when served, the court would thereby accord
less protection to an individual defendant than to his or her property within the
state. Surely the Shaffer Court did not intend such an illogical and unfair result.
(citation omitted). Moreover, transient jurisdiction may constitute an unwarranted
and undesirable burden on commerce.
Id. at 313.
39. 765 F.2d 42 (3d Cir. 1985).
40. Purposefully excluded from this note are the facts concerning whether IAAF had
minimum contacts with New Jersey. The court limited its analysis to the issue of whether
personal service of process was sufficient to obtain personal jurisdiction because the lower
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol44/iss3/8
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neither logic nor history supports the assertion of personal jurisdiction over
an unincorporated association based solely on service of its agent within
the forum.41 Because Nehemiah focused mainly on the validity of obtaining
personal jurisdiction over an unincorporated association through the physical
service of one of the association's agents, the usefulness of Nehemiah to
the focus of this note is limited. 42
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has not specifically addressed the issue of
transient jurisdiction.43 However, it is possible to predict from Oklahoma's
treatment of personal service of process that Oklahoma would validate
transient jurisdiction. On numerous occasions, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
has held that personal service of process is void if the process is obtained
by enticing the potential defendant into the territorial jurisdiction of the
court by means of fraud, deceit, trick, or devise. 4" Accordingly, Oklahoma
implicitly recognizes the inherent power that service of process has to confer
personal jurisdiction over the person served. There would be no compelling
reason to void the service of process if the service of process did not itself
confer personal jurisdiction. 45 Thus, Oklahoma apparently would recognize
the validity of transient jurisdiction as a method to obtain personal juris-
diction."
court never addressed the question of whether IAAF had adequate minimum contacts with
New Jersey.
41. Id. at 47.
42. Id. at 46. In Nehemiah, the court stated in dicta that "[ilt is arguable that the transient
presence basis for jurisdiction over any defendant, including an individual, is no longer viable."
Id. (emphasis added). Relying on Shaffer, the court also stated that "[i]f the mere presence
of property cannot support quasi in rem jurisdiction, it is difficult to find a basis in logic and
fairness to conclude that the more fleeting physical presence of a non-resident person can
support personal jurisdiction." Id. at 47 (emphasis in original).
43. An analysis of Oklahoma statutory law also fails to clearly answer the question of
whether Oklahoma would recognize the validity of transient jurisdiction. The Oklahoma
Pleading Code states that "[a] court of this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis
consistent with the Constitution of this state and the Constitution of the United States." 12
OKA. STAT. § 2004(F) (Supp. 1989). Some states have statutes which specifically allow personal
jurisdiction to be asserted over nonresident defendants based solely on the defendant's transient
presence in the forum. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.05.015(a)(1)(A) (1990); MICH. CoMP.
LAws ANN. § 600.701(1) (West 1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-75.4(l)(a) (1983); N.D. R. Civ.
P. 4(b)(1) (1990); OR. R. Civ. P. 4A.1 (1989); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 801.05(1) (West 1977).
44. See Commercial Bank & Trust Co. v. District Court, 605 P.2d 1323, 1325 (Okla. 1980);
Strong v. Strong, 299 P.2d 148, 150 (Okla. 1956).
45. See Anderson v. Atkins, 161 Tenn. 137, 29 S.W.2d 248 (1930).
46. But see Barnes v. Wilson, 580 P.2d 991, 993-94 (Okla. 1978) (there is no automatic
formula which can be used to determine whether a court has in personam jurisdiction over a
nonresident). Barnes is apparently in conflict with the basic premise behind transient jurisdic-
tion, which is that there is an automatic formula (physical presence = personal jurisdiction)
if the person is physically served within the forum. Barnes emphasizes the necessity in applying
the minimum contacts test as a general guideline in determining questions of personal juris-
diction over nonresident defendants. Id. at 993. The doctrine of transient jurisdiction does not
utilize a minimum contacts test in its analysis. See supra text accompanying notes 4-5.
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The American Law Institute (ALl) has furthered the confusion as to
whether transient jurisdiction is a valid basis for personal jurisdiction. Prior
to Shaffer, the ALI clearly favored the validity of transient jurisdiction. 4
However, following Shaffer, the ALI's staunch approval of transient juris-
diction lessened. 48
Additionally, the revised Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws adds
even more confuslon by attempting to incorporate both physical presence
and minimum contacts into a single proposition. 49 The revision states that
"[a] state has power to exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who
is present within its territory unless the individual's relationship to the state
is so attenuated as to make the exercise of such jurisdiction unreasonable." 50
The ALI's attempt to reconcile Shaffer with the doctrine of transient
jurisdiction is both unhelpful and inconsistent. By qualifying a state's power
to exercise jurisdiction over a physically present individual, the ALl allows
an individual who is personally served within a forum to escape jurisdiction
if he can prove that jurisdiction would be unreasonable. The ALI's revision
contravenes the basic premise of transient jurisdiction because the doctrine
of transient jurisdiction is based solely on the presence of the individual,
regardless of whether jurisdiction may be unreasonable.
II. Burnham v. Superior Court
A. Facts
Dennis Burnhan and Francie Burnham married in 1976 in West Virginia.
The following year, the couple moved to New Jersey, where their two
children were born. In July 1987, the Burnhams separated. Mrs. Burnham
took custody of the children and moved to California. Prior to Mrs.
Burnham's departure for California, the couple agreed that they would file
for divorce on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. Mr. Burnham
continued to live in New Jersey after Mrs. Burnham moved to California.
47. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONFLCT OF LAWS § 28 (1971). "A state has power to
exercise judicial jurisdiction over an individual who is present within its territory, whether
permanently or temporarily." Id. A defendant's "presence in the state, even for an instant,
gives the state judicial jurisdiction over him." Id. § 28 comment a.
48. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 8 comment a (1982). The Restatement (Second)
of Judgments comments that Shaffer seems to undercut the proposition that a defendant's
presence gives the state jurisdiction. Id. The comment states that "the effect of Shaffer v.
Heitner is considerable. It would establish 'minimum contacts' in place of presence as the
principle basis for territorial jurisdiction." Id.
49. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLUCT OF LAWS § 28 (proposed revisions 1986).
50. Id. § 28 (emphasis added). Comment b also provides:
[Clonsiderations of reasonableness qualify the power of a State to exercise
personal jurisdiction over an individual on the basis of his physical presence
within its territory. Jurisdiction will exist in such a case if the individual's
relationship to the state can justly be described as significant, which would be
the case if he has been present there for a substantial period of time.
Id. § 28 comment b (proposed revisions 1986) (emphasis added); see also id. §§ 16-17 (proposed
revisions 1986).
[Vol. 44:551
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In October 1987, Mr. Burnham filed for divorce in New Jersey state
court. Mr. Burnham did not attempt to serve process on Mrs. Burnham.
In January 1988, Mrs. Burnham filed for divorce in California state court.
In the same month, Mr. Burnham travelled to California for three days to
conduct business and to visit his children. Mr. Burnham was served in
California while at his wife's home.5 1 Mr. Burnham then returned to New
Jersey.
Mr. Burnham later returned to California and made a "special
appearance" 52 in the California Superior Court. Mr. Burnham moved to
quash the service of process, claiming that the California court lacked
personal jurisdiction over him. 3 The California Superior Court upheld the
service of process on Mr. Burnham. 54 The California Court of Appeals
denied Mr. Burnham's writ of mandamus. 5 The United States Supreme
Court granted Mr. Burnham's writ of certiorari in October 1989.56
B. Holding
The issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment allows a California court to assert
personal jurisdiction over a nonresident individual based on personal service
of process while the nonresident is temporarily in California on business
unconnected with the cause of action.57 The Court was unanimous in its
decision that the service of process in California was sufficient to allow
California to assert personal jurisdiction over Mr. Burnham." Although the
justices were unanimous in their decision, the justices split 4-4-1 in their
reasoning. 9
C. The Burnham Opinions
1. The Scalia Alliance6"
Proposing that the validity of transient jurisdiction is proven by historical
precedent, Justice Scalia cited English cases dating back to 1675 and Amer-
51. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109. During Mr. Burnham's visit to California, Mr. Burnham
took his older child to visit San Francisco for the weekend. Apparently Mr. Burnham was
served while returning the child to Mrs. Burnham's house.
52. Id. A "special appearance" is defined as a submission to the jurisdiction of a court
for some specific purpose only, not for all purposes of the lawsuit. BLAcK's LAW DicTioNARY
89 (5th ed. 1979). A special appearance allows the defendant to object to the jurisdiction of
the court without'submitting to such jurisdiction. Id.
53. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 2115.
59. For the composition of the Burnham Court, see supra note 6.
60. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2109-17. Justice Scalia's opinion announced the judgment
of the Court. His opinion is divided into three parts. He was joined in parts I, II-A, II-B,
and II-C by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Kennedy and White. Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Kennedy joined in parts II-D and III. Justice White failed to join Justice Scalia's
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ican cases dating back to 1793.61 According to Justice Scalia, the few
American cases since 1978 which have invalidated the doctrine of transient
jurisdiction are erroneous.62 Justice Scalia summarized his proposition with
the broad statement that there is neither a state or federal statute nor a
state judicial decision that has abandoned in-state service of process as a
basis for jurisdiction. 3
Justice Scalia introduced the next part of his opinion" by stating that
Mr. Burnham's reliance on the International Shoe standard for the assertion
that there must be "continuous and systematic" contacts in all assertions
of personal jurisdiction is incorrect.65 According to Justice Scalia, the In-
ternational Shoe standard was developed to recognize the fact that due
process does not necessarily require that states adhere to the strict territorial
limits in Pennoyer.6 The minimum contacts test of International Shoe is
not necessary in jurisdictional questions when the defendant is present in
the forum.67 Rather, the minimum contacts test of International Shoe sub-
stitutes for the physical presence of the defendant as the basis for jurisdic-
tion.68 Justice Scdia concluded that nothing in International Shoe or its
progeny supports the proposition that a defendant's presence in a forum is
insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction.
69
The next part of Justice Scalia's opinion 7° addressed Shaffer's effect on
the doctrine of transient jurisdiction. Justice Scalia commented that Mr.
Burnham's strongest argument relied on Shaffer.71 Mr. Burnham offered
the Shaffer statement that "all assertions of state-court jurisdiction must
rejection of Shaffer (part II-D) and criticism of Brennan (part III). See infra text accompanying
notes 99-101.
61. Id. at 2110-11. Justice Scalia stated:
Among the most firmly established principles of personal jurisdiction in Amer-
ican tradition is that the courts of a State have jurisdiction over nonresidents
who are physically present in the State. The view developed early that each State
had the power to hale before its courts any individual who could be found within
its borders, and that once having acquired jurisdiction over such a person by
properly serving him with process, the State could retain jurisdiction to enter
judgment against him, no matter how fleeting his visit.
Id. at 2110. (emphasi3 added). Justice Scalia cited approximately forty cases to support his
proposition. Id. at 2110-13. He also noted that Justice Story traced the doctrine of transient
jurisdiction to Roman origins. Id. at 2111.
62. Id. at 2113.
63. Id.
64. See id. This is part II-C of the Justice Scalia opinion.
65. Id. at 2113. Mr. Burnham argued that the result of International Shoe was to change
the focus in all personal jurisdiction questions to include the minimum contacts test.
66. Id. at 2114 (emphasis in original).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 2115. Justice Scalia also stated that the proposition that a defendant's presence
is insufficient to establish personal jurisdiction is "unfaithful to both elementary logic and the
foundations of our due process jurisprudence." Id.
70. See id. This is part II-D of Justice Scalia's opinion.
71. Id.
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be evaluated according to the standards set forth in International Shoe and
its progeny" as supporting the proposition that a defendant must have
minimum contacts with the forum, even in cases of the defendant's transitory
presence, in order for the forum to obtain personal jurisdiction.72 Complex
analysis was employed in disagreeing with Mr. Burnham's proposition.
Justice Scalia initially reemphasized his argument that Shaffer, like Inter-
national Shoe, involved an absent defendant and therefore "stands for
nothing more than the proposition" that the minimum contacts standard is
a substitute for physical presence.7 3 Justice Scalia maintained that when the
Shaffer statement 74 is read in context with its preceding two sentences,
5
Shaffer indicates that the only categories of jurisdiction which are required
to satisfy the minimum contacts test are those based on absent defendants,
such as quasi in rem jurisdiction.76 The Court has traditionally treated the
two classes of defendants, absent defendants and physically present defen-
dants, separately.7 Shaffer cannot be read to signal an intention that
physically present defendants must now be treated identically with absent
defendants.78 Justice Scalia concluded that the minimum contacts test of
International Shoe applies only to absent defendants and that nothing in
Shaffer expands that requirement.
7 9
Finally, Justice Scalia refused to render an opinion as to whether the
transient jurisdiction rule is fair or desirable, leaving that debate to state
legislatures.8 0 Satisfied by his analysis that transient jurisdiction satisfies
traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice, Justice Scalia left
the door open to forthcoming disputes by stating that future procedures,
unknown today, may require new analysis to determine whether traditional
notions of fair play and substantial justice have been violated.,
2. The Brennan Alliance8
2
Justice Brennan wrote the concurring opinion in Burnham. Brennan
immediately expressed dissatisfaction with Justice Scalia's extensive depend-
ence on historical precedent.83 Relying on Shaffer, Brennan stated that "all
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
75. The preceding two sentences of the Shaffer statement are "[t]he fiction that an assertion
of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the
property supports an ancient form without substantial modem justification. Its continued
acceptance would serve only to allow state-court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to
the defendant." Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 212.
76. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2116.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. See id. at 2120-26. Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and
O'Connor. Notably, Justice O'Connor, normally part of the conservative majority, joined
Justice Brennan.
83. Id. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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rules of jurisdiction, even ancient ones, must satisfy contemporary notions
of due process." Even ancient doctrines may violate due process when
new procedures, unknown when the ancient doctrines were widely accepted,
are adopted." The crux of Brennan's position was that the doctrine of
transient jurisdiction, even if based on historical precedent, should not
automatically be exempt from the requirement that it satisfy contemporary
notions of due process.
Justice Brennan agreed with Justice Scalia that the holding in Shaffer
may have been limited to quasi in. rem jurisdiction, but refused to concede
that the analysis in Shaffer is as limited as Justice Scalia suggested.16 Brennan
stressed the fact that Shaffer was a reexamination of the appropriateness
of the quasi in rem jurisdiction rule, a rule faithfully condoned in American
courts for one hundred years; therefore, Shaffer characterizes the Court's
willingness to disregard historical precedent when due process requires. 87
Summarizing, Justice Brennan stated that every assertion of jurisdiction,
including transient jurisdiction, even if entrenched in judicial precedent,
must comport with contemporary notions of due process.88
Next, responding to Justice Scalia's assertion that transient jurisdiction is
ingrained in American jurisprudence, Justice Brennan cited cases from the
seventeenth century which demonstrated a judicial unwillingness to accept
transient jurisdiction. 9 Brennan conceded that transient jurisdiction was
widely accepted following Pennoyer.90 However, Brennan utilized the prev-
alence of transient jurisdiction following Pennoyer to support his proposition
that a defendant who enters a forum has notice and a reasonable expectation
that he may be subject to the jurisdiction of the forum. 91
84. Id. (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 2121.
86. Id.
87. Id. Justice Brennan also noted that Justice Scalia admitted that historical precedence
may be disregarded when historical precedence conflicts with contemporary notions of due
process:
Even Justice SCALIA's opinion concedes that sometimes courts may discard
"traditional" rules when they no longer comport with contemporary notions of
due process. For example, although, beginning with the Romans, judicial tribunals
for over a millennium permitted jurisdiction to be acquired by force, (citation
omitted) by the 19th century, as Justice SCALIA acknowledges, this method had
largely disappeared. (citation omitted). I do not see why Justice SCALIA's opinion
assumes that there is no further progress to be made and that the evolution of
our legal system and the society in which it operates, ended 100 years ago.
Id. at 2121 n.3 (emphasis in original).
88. Id. at 2121-22.
89. Id. at 2122-24. In complete disagreement with Justice Scalia, Justice Brennan stated
that the rule of transient jurisdiction was "a stranger to the common law" and "weakly
implanted in American jurisprudence" at the time that the fourteenth amendment was adopted.
Id. at 2122-23.
90. Id. at 2123-24.
91. Id. at 2124. Justice Brennan also cited Justice Stevens' concurrence in Shaffer in
support of the proposition that the rule of transient jurisdiction is consistent with reasonable
expectations of defendants. Id. at 2124. Justice Stevens states in Shaffer that "[i]f I visit
another State, . . . I knowingly assume some risk that the State will exercise its power over
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The final portion of Justice Brennan's concurring opinion is undoubtedly
the most controversial. Brennan declared:
By visiting the forum State, a transient defendant actually
"avail[s]" himself of significant benefits provided by the State.
His health and safety are guaranteed by the State's police, fire,
and emergency medical services; he is free to travel on the state's
roads and waterways; he likely enjoys the fruits of the State's
economy as well. 92
According to Justice Brennan, Mr. Burnham's ability to utilize the above
stated benefits while in California supplies the minimum contacts with
California such that jurisdiction over Mr. Burnham comports with contem-
porary notions of due process. Brennan does not concede that Mr. Burn-
ham's presence in California is singly sufficient to allow California to obtain
personal jurisdiction. Rather, Brennan's position is that, on the facts of
this case, Mr. Burnham's presence in California satisfies contemporary
notions of due process.
Finally, Justice Brennan preempted the argument that a transient defen-
dant may be burdened by the requirement that the defendant litigate in a
forum in which his only contact may be his momentary presence. 93 Brennan
remarked that modern transportation and communications lessen this po-
tential burden.94 Additionally, the fact that the defendant was in the forum
on at least one previous occasion, presumably when the defendant was
served, indicates to Brennan that a suit in the forum would not be "pro-
hibitively inconvenient." 95
3. The Stevens Opinion96
Justice Stevens, who was not joined by any other justice, concurred in
the judgment of the Court. Stevens' brief concurrence stated, without further
explanation, that both the Scalia and Brennan opinions are too broad.
97
Stevens approved of both Justice Scalia's use of historical precedent and
Brennan's considerations of fairness. 9
4. The White Opinion"
Justice White acknowledged that the rule of transient jurisdiction is
"widely accepted throughout this country."' 10 White maintained that until
my property or my person while there. My contact with the State, though minimal, gives rise
to predictable risks." Shaffer, 433 U.S. at 218 (Stevens, J., concurring).
92. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2124-25 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
93. Id. at 2125.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 2126 (Stevens, J., concurring).
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 2119-20. Justice White joined Justice Scalia in part I, parts II-A, II-B, and
II-C.
100. Id. at 2119.
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it can be shown that the rule of transient jurisdiction is "so arbitrary and
lacking in common sense in so many instances that it should be held violative
of Due Process in every case," the Court should not entertain claims of
nonresident defendants subject to the rule.' 10
5. Justice Scalia's Response to the Brennan Concurrence'0
2
Justice Brennan's concurrence prompted a fervent response from Justice
Scalia. Scalia disagreed with Brennan's proposition that satisfying contem-
porary notions of due process requires that transient jurisdictional disputes
be evaluated according to each justice's subjective assessment of what is
fair.' °3 Justice Scalia warned that Justice Brennan's proposed requirement,
that the justices utilize their own notions of fair play and substantial justice,
would contravene the International Shoe test, which requires the consider-
ation of traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.
°4
Justice Scalia's main disagreement with Justice Brennan's opinion was
that Brennan did not establish a standard which could be easily applied. 05
Scalia complained that Brennan's conclusion - that jurisdiction over Mr.
Burnham is appropriate - is based solely on the specific facts of the case.'06
In fact, Justice Scalia objected to Brennan's use of the word "rule" to
describe Brennan's proposition.'07 Justice Scalia characterized Brennan's
approach as a "'totality of the circumstances" test which guaranteed liti-
gation and uncertainty, the same problems that traditional territorial rules
of jurisdiction were originally designed to avoid. 0 s Justice Scalia pondered
how the Brennan opinion would change if, for example, Mr. Burnham was
in California for only fifteen minutes, as opposed to three days.1m
D. Analysis of the Burnham Opinions
Justice Scalia unequivocally supported the traditional rule that mere serv-
ice of process on a nonresident defendant is a valid method to assert personal
jurisdiction over a defendant. Justice Scalia relied heavily on historical
precedent as a basis for his opinion.
101. Id. at 2119-20.
102. See id. at 2117-19.
103. Id. at 2117. Justice Brennan, in apparent response to this assertion by Justice Scalia,
noted that he intended that each justice's inquiry should be guided not by subjective intent,
but by International Shoe and its progeny. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2122 n.7. Brennan stated
that the Court's experience with the International Shoe approach demonstrates the Court's
competency in employing it. Id.
104. Id. at 2117.
105. Id. at 2118.
106. Id. at 2118-19.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 2119.
109. Id. at 2118. Justice Scalia also questioned whether Justice Brennan's opinion that
jurisdiction over Mr. Burnham was "fair" would still be considered fair if Mr. Burnham was
in California to visit a sick or dying child. Id.
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The advantage of Justice Scalia's opinion is certainty in application of
the doctrine of transient jurisdiction. Scalia supported the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over a defendant who is served within the forum,
regardless of contacts or lack of contacts with the forum. Thus, personal
jurisdictional disputes in cases when the defendant is served in the forum
would be reduced to the simple inquiry of whether the defendant was
actually served during a moment in time when the defendant was physically
within the boundaries of the forum. Under Justice Scalia's proposition, the
minimum contacts test is inapplicable in situations when a defendant is
physically served in the forum.
An objection to the Justice Scalia opinion is the same objection that
commentators have long had with the doctrine of transient jurisdiction -
forcing a transient defendant to litigate a claim in a forum in which his
only contact was his momentary presence is unfair."10 Scalia sacrificed the
possible inequitable results of forcing a transient defendant to litigate in the
state in which the defendant has no other contacts except for the physical
service of process for the advantage of the simplistic rule that physical
service of process automatically confers personal jurisdiction.
Justice Brennan's opinion, however, focused more on the possible ineq-
uities of transient jurisdiction than on the appeal of a simple standard.
Brennan supported the proposition that the minimum contacts test of In-
ternational Shoe must be applied in all assertions of personal jurisdiction.
Consequently, the mere service of process of a transient defendant may be
insufficient as a basis for personal jurisdiction if the defendant's contacts
with the forum are so minimal that the assertion of jurisdiction would
violate notions of fair play and substantial justice.
IV. The Ramifications of Burnham
The effect that Burnham will have on the doctrine of transient jurisdiction
remains unclear. Undoubtedly, courts will be confused by the badly fractured
assortment of opinions."' The obvious effect of Burnham will be to quell
commentators' opinions"2 that the doctrine of transient jurisdiction is dead.
Many courts will question whether Burnham adopted a "sweeping rule"
that transient jurisdiction is valid in all instances or merely offered another
situation in which to apply the minimum contacts test.
110. See Bernstine, supra note 1, at 60-62; Ehrenzweig, supra note 3, at 289-90; Werner,
supra note 1, at 588.
111. See Smith v. Smith, 459 N.W.2d 785 (N.D. 1990). Smith, one of the first courts to
address Burnham, stated:
Because Joan [the defendant] was not served personally in North Dakota, we
need not struggle to analyze or apply the various opinions in Burnham. Those
opinions, although reaching the same result, take differing views of the effect of
Shaffer, and whether or not personal service is, alone, a valid predicate for in
personam jurisdiction in the forum State. Presumably, we will be further enlight-
ened as to the Supreme Court's position in future decisions.
Id. at 788 n.3 (citation omitted).
112. See supra note 3.
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The Scalia alliance would obviously support an absolute rule, based on
the Pennoyer power theory. The alliance reasoned that service of process
over the defendant will be effective in obtaining personal jurisdiction over
the defendant in all conceivable instances."' The Brennan alliance opposed
an absolute rule and, accordingly, criticized Justice Scalia for advocating
113. See supra text accompanying notes 64-69. Surprisingly, not even the attorney repre-
senting Mrs. Burnham supported the adoption of an absolute rule that transient jurisdiction
was valid in all situations. The following colloquium between the attorney and the Court is
enlightening:
Attorney: The father's presence in California was not transient; he had been in
the state over 20 times before.
Justice White: Can he be served in New York?
Attorney: My personal view is that he could.
Justice O'Conncr: Is it okay if he were served while flying over a state?
Attorney: No. The facts in Grace [Grace v. MacArthur, 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D.
Ark. 1959)] do not lead to a fair result.
O'Connor: What about service while changing planes in an airport?
Attorney: I'd have a harder time justifying that, but it isn't necessary to resolve
that situation.
O'Connor: But the power theory would resolve that, would it not?
Attorney: Yes.
O'Connor: And is that the theory you espouse?
Attorney: No. The ALl rule [Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 28
(1989)] is eminently reasonable; there is no need for the court to issue a sweeping
rule.
Burnham v. Superior Court, 58 U.S.L.W. 3585 (Mar. 20, 1990) (emphasis added).
The Brennan alliance represents the position of Mr. Burnham's counsel, that service of
process in and of itself is insufficient to base personal jurisdiction. One would assume the
Justice Scalia alliance would represent Mrs. Burnham's position, that service of process is
sufficient to confer jurisdiction. It is clear, however, from the above colloquium, that the
Justice Scalia alliance adopted a rule even broader than proposed by Mrs. Burnham.
There are four interesting points in the above colloquium. First, the attorney for Mrs.
Burnham stated that Grace does not lead to a fair result. Clearly, if the attorney was proposing
a rule as broad as adopted by Justice Scalia, the attorney would have answered that the ruling
in Grace, regardless of its inequity, was proper because the only relevant inquiry, according
to Justice Scalia, would be whether the defendant in Grace was actually physically served while
in the forum. Second, the attorney shied away from the question about service of process
while a defendant was changing planes in an airport. Under the Scalia approach, the service
of process in that instance would be sufficient to confer personal jurisdiction, regardless of
the defendant's momentary presence within the territorial boundaries of the forum. Third, the
attorney's answer that he does not support the power theory completely contradicts the very
theory upon which Justice Scalia's entire opinion was subsequently based.
The final point is the most interesting. The attorney expressed approval of section 28 of the
Revised Restatement of Conflicts. See supra note 49. The ALI's opinion is the exact position
espoused by Justice Brennan - that physical presence will be sufficient as a basis for personal
jurisdiction only if the essertion of jurisdiction over the defendant would be fair. Justice Scalia
clearly would disapprove of the ALI's opinion because it does not allow personal jurisdiction
in all instances in which the defendant was physically served with process in the forum. Under
the Justice Scalia analysis, the concept of fairness is completely excluded.
The importance of this is that the Scalia opinion, even though ruling in faVor of Mrs.
Burnham, adopted a rule which Mrs. Burnham's counsel did not even support. Justice Scalia's
reasoning that transient jurisdiction is based solely on the power theory, with no place for the
International Shoe standard, was completely unexpected.
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an absolute rule which excludes the minimum contacts analysis. Justice
Brennan's alliance viewed transient jurisdiction as valid only in situations
in which the defendant's contacts, in addition to the actual service of
process, make the assertion of personal jurisdiction over the defendant
consistent with notions of fair play and substantial justice.
In addition to the uncertainty as to the rule of law established by
Burnham, the Brennan opinion leaves many questions unanswered. Bren-
nan's disapproval of Justice Scalia's sweeping rule sacrifices certainty in
future application of the Burnham decision. In future cases, courts attempt-
ing to apply the Brennan position will be confronted with the task of
applying the minimum contacts standard. Brennan announced no clear
standard, except for International Shoe, to assist courts faced with transient
jurisdictional questions. Obviously, a case presenting Burnham-like facts
would lead to the conclusion that service of process, in addition to the
defendant's contacts, is a sufficient basis to assert personal jurisdiction. The
real problem arises when the facts of a future case suggest that the defen-
dant, who was served within the forum, had fewer contacts with the forum
than Mr. Burnham had with California.
The Scalia position equally creates confusion. Justice Scalia agreed with
Justice Brennan on one point - that the doctrine of transient jurisdiction
is invalid in cases in which the defendant was not in the forum "voluntarily"
when service was made on the defendant." 4 This agreement by Justice Scalia
creates more problems than it solves.
First, the fact that Justice Scalia would invalidate transient jurisdiction
when the defendant is not voluntarily in the forum undermines Scalia's
power theory. Scalia's premise is that a forum has jurisdiction over a
physically present defendant, without regard to International Shoe. How-
ever, by creating an exception to the power theory in cases in which the
defendant is forced or fraudulently enticed into the forum, Justice Scalia is
impliedly stating that it would be unfair to subject a defendant to the
jurisdiction of the court.
Justice Scalia certainly proposed this exception to avoid the potential
situation in which a process server could forcibly detain a potential defendant
and transport the defendant into the forum in order to serve process. Few
people will question the necessity for this exception in a civilized society.
The problem remains, however, that the exception is not justified under
the traditional power theory upon which Justice Scalia so heavily relies.
Under the traditional power theory, the only question is whether the defen-
dant was physically served within the boundaries of the state." 5 When Scalia
abandoned this traditional theory in favor of an exception which Scalia
believed to be equitable, Scalia was yielding to the same "fairness" evalu-
ation that he criticized Justice Brennan for employing.
114. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2118.
115. See supra notes 12-15 and accompanying text. Justice Brennan noted that the Roman
tribunals, for more than a millennium, allowed jurisdiction to be acquired by force. Id. at
2121 n.3.
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The second problem in the exception agreed upon by Justices Scalia and
Brennan lies in the vagueness of the concept of "voluntarily." Obviously,
instances in which actual force or fraud are used to obtain service over a
defendant are not the problem. The problem lies in defining when a defen-
dant is "voluntarily" within the forum. Consider the following hypothetical
situations:"1
6
(1) the defendant is injured in an automobile accident; the defendant is
transported from the accident site to a hospital in the forum state;
(2) the defendant is flying in a plane which is forced to land in the forum
state; the plane's original flight plan was not over the forum state;
(3) the defendant is fulfilling a military commitment; the defendant's
original military assignment was not in the forum state; the defendant is
transferred to the forum state.
In each of the above examples, the defendant is physically within the
forum when served with process. Justice Brennan would not allow the
service of process to confer personal jurisdiction over the defendant because
the defendant's contacts with the forum are so attenuated. Brennan would
undoubtedly reason that the assertion of jurisdiction over such a defendant
would not comport with the International Shoe standard of fair play and
substantial justice.
Justice Scalia, however, would be in a difficult position. The fact that
the defendant was actually Within the borders of the forum state suggests
that Scalia would support jurisdiction, regardless of the situation surround-
ing the defendant',; presence. However, Justice Scalia would be forced to
reconcile the fact that the defendant's presence within the state was not as
voluntary as Mr. Burnham's presence in California. If Scalia failed to find
that there was proper personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Scalia would
be creating yet another exception to his absolute power theory.
The policy effects of the confusing Burnham opinion are significant.
Modern technology promotes commerce by allowing business travelers to
commute throughout the country on a daily basis. A divorced parent, similar
to Mr. Burnham, who yearns to visit his children in another state must
weigh the probability of being forced to litigate a claim thousands of miles
from his residence against his desire to visit his children. In other words,
Burnham may have a chilling effect on nationwide travel, resulting in far
reaching consequences.
Admittedly, transient jurisdiction is not the most common method to
obtain personal jurisdiction. However, in cases of "high stakes" and "big
dollars," the Justice Scalia position will introduce a new concept in service
of process. Process servers involved in big cases will become infinitely wise
in the daily travel schedules of airlines. Planning a trip will require pre-
departure evaluations of the flight plans of the airplane. In cases of divorced
parents, the parent's ability to visit his children in other states may depend
on the parent's ability to avoid process servers.
116. All the examples presented assume that the defendant's only contact with the forum
state is the given situation.
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V. Conclusion
Following the Supreme Court decision in Shaffer, commentators were of
nearly unanimous opinion that the rule of transient jurisdiction was dead.
The Supreme Court decision in Burnham resurrected this dead rule. Burn-
ham will be hailed as a landmark decision in the sphere of jurisdiction. The
polar positions taken by the two alliances of Justices Scalia and Brennan
result in the Court's announcement of two standards concerning transient
jurisdiction. Justice Scalia proposes that the power theory control transient
jurisdiction; Justice Brennan proposes that transient jurisdiction, although
valid, must be buffered by the minimum contacts test.
Courts will be confronted with the question of which position to follow.
Ultimately, courts are likely to utilize the Justice Brennan position as the
lesser of two evils. Justice Scalia's opinion is based on outdated concepts
of fairness and equity. Moreover, Scalia is unwilling to accept that people
of the 1990s are more migratory than people were in the 1877 days of
Pennoyer.
No absolute rule can account for all contingencies and, hence, the dis-
advantage of Justice Scalia's proposition. Justice Brennan's proposition to
use the minimum contacts test in all instances of transient jurisdictional
disputes may be current, but it remains more unpredictable than the absolute
rule proposed by Scalia. Brennan's proposition should not be disregarded
simply because of the difficulty in its application. The value of Brennan's
position lies in its considerations of fair play and substantial justice in all
transient jurisdictional disputes. Utilization of Brennan's position will not
disrupt the justice system; rather, it will insure that the results of jurisdic-
tional disputes are compatible with society's current concepts of equity and
fairness.
Armand Paliotta
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